As you may have heard, the Orioles completed a swap with the New York Yankees this past weekend.  They dealt right-handed reliever Chris Britton for right-handed starter Jaret Wright and $4 million.  The money will reduce Wright's 2007 salary to $3 million.  Wright's contract expires at the end of 2007.  2006 was Britton's rookie season.

This is a horrible trade for the Orioles; it's absolutely appallingly bad, though, I would argue, more for what it says about the direction of the franchise than the actual trade itself.

But let's focus on the specific trade; it's not as though there's anything very positive to say about it to begin with.

The Orioles are now faced with paying a 31-year-old pitcher $3 million presumably to be the club's fifth starter in 2007.  

Make that a broken down 31-year-old pitcher.  Jaret Wright has never thrown 200 innings in a season.  It should be noted that Wright has been a starter in all but one year of his career, which started in 1997.  He has reached the 150-inning mark exactly twice, most recently in 2004.  He's had chronic shoulder problems.  He averaged fewer than five innings per start for the Yankees in 2006.

Make that a lousy broken down 31-year-old pitcher.  Wright's career ERA is over five.  In his two seasons in the Bronx, Wright allowed 238 hits and walked 89 batters in 204 innings while striking out 118.  His career per nine innings marks are...hits:  9.67; walks: 4.28; strikeouts: 6.43.  Every one of those statistics is worse than the composite league average.

In exchange, the Orioles gave up Chris Britton, who allowed 46 hits, 17 walks and fanned 41 batters in 53.2 innings pitched in his rookie year.  Britton turns 24 in December and was the second most reliable relief pitcher the Orioles featured in 2006.

On its face, it's difficult to find anything to like about this deal.

But there's far more to it than that.  One could argue that, in isolation, this deal doesn't mean very much.  Wright's acquisition presumably had something to do with the career season he managed under Orioles pitching coach Leo Mazzone when the two were united in Atlanta in 2004.  Wright may turn out to be a serviceable fifth starter for the Birds in 2006, giving Hayden Penn additional time to get his act together.  And the Orioles quietly expressed concerns about Britton even when he was performing his most effective work in 2006; the team worried about Britton's weight problems and his limited repertoire.  Britton may not end up being much of a contributor over the long run.

Fine.

But this trade represents an eerie reminder to me of the Denny Bautista-Jason Grimsley trade back in 2004--not so much because of any perfect comparison between the roles or specific talents of the principals involved, but because of what it seems to imply about the way the Orioles front office views its strategy for moving this franchise forward.

If the Orioles feel they need a backup plan for the rotation for 2007 given the youth and "not ready for prime time" performance of some of the young starting candidates, that's fine.  Whether Jaret Wright and his inability to routinely work into the sixth inning represents the best such choice is questionable, but we'll let that slide for the moment.  The parallel with the Bautista-Grimsley deal is straight forward--in 2004, the Orioles were desperate to add a reliable right-handed arm to the bullpen.  Whether Grimsley should have been so-viewed, is dubious, but again, the need was arguably there.

If the Orioles feel that Chris Britton isn't going to be long-term help to the big league staff for the reasons asserted above, that's a case that can legitimately be debated.  This is quite similar to the Bautista situation in '04; the front office had concluded that Bautista wasn't to be counted on for the long-term for a variety of reasons.  That was a reasonable conclusion at the time and looks more reasonable with each passing month.

So far, so good.  The Orioles decided that they have needs--a right-handed reliever a couple of seasons ago, a rotation backup for 2007.  They also decided that a couple of young players in their farm system--a fireballing right-hander with killer stuff (Bautista) in 2004 and a young right-handed reliever (Britton) in 2006 who had already shown more than a hint of big league success--weren't going to be long-term aids to the major league team.

The problem, in both instances, is what the team has done to deal with these situations.  In the 2004 case, they dealt a player with obvious perceived value for a pitcher who was about to turn 37 years of age who represented, at best, bulk right-handed relief.  Grimsley was a throw away player when they picked him up. (He had arguably been nothing more than that since he flamed out as a prospect with the Phillies in the early 1990s...but I digress.)  Players like Jason Grimsley in 2004 populate Triple-A rosters and the waiver wire; there was no reason to waste a tradable commodity on him.  If the Orioles didn't want Bautista, he should have been used to deal--as part of a package if need be--for something that the Orioles could use long-term.  That wasn't Jason Grimsley.

The same can be said for Jaret Wright and Chris Britton.  Sub-mediocre starting pitchers who are chronically hurt and can't consistently work past the fifth inning are falling out of trees.  Most of them can be had for less than $3 million a season and essentially all of them can be had without surrendering any talent.  Even if the Orioles feel that Chris Britton isn't the answer, he's clearly got value.  He's young (he'll be 24 in 2007), he's cheap (he's making the major league minimum and won't be arbitration eligible for three years) and he did pitch effectively in his rookie season.  As was the case with Bautista, if the Orioles felt he wasn't part of their future, he should have been moved--as part of a package if need be--for something that the Orioles could use long-term.  That isn't Jaret Wright.

I have this uncanny feeling of deja vu.

Up to this point, and despite the Bautista-Grimsley trade, I've more or less believed that the Orioles front office understood what they needed to do to have any chance of reviving the franchise.  Whether or not they were actually capable of successfully carrying out this strategy was another matter entirely, but I did believe that they understood what the course of action should be.  

I must infer that this latest trade puts that conclusion in serious doubt; it's essentially impossible to reconcile this deal with the requisite rebuilding strategy.

If the decision makers in the Warehouse don't understand this much, heaven help us.

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