1) make a decision about what to do with that player; and

2) act on that decision

...before the player enters his final season prior to free agency (or aribitration eligibility or whatever). 

Sign him, trade him, do something with him.  Do not allow that last season to begin without clearing up the problem.   There are two reasons for this:

1) The days of receiving legitimate prospects for veterans midway through their final season under contract/restricted rights are over.  Every once in awhile someone still comes up with a diamond in the rough, but teams aren't dealing Jeff Bagwell for Larry Andersen anymore.  A key reason for this change is teams not only recognize the value of talented young players (most teams have always been aware of this asset), but the three years during which a team completely controls the remuneration level of players like this are more valuable than ever before. 

Players like Mark Buehrle (barely receiving the major league minimum despite being one of baseball's top pitchers the last two years) and Alfonso Soriano (even the Yankees aren't paying Soriano big money...because they don't have to) are more than worth their weight in gold.  Ditto the likes of Austin Kearns, Adam Dunn, Albert Pujols, Mark Prior, Eric Hinske, Aubrey Huff, Brett Myers, etc.  All of these players are significant contributors to their respective teams (that's putting it awfully mildly in some cases), but none are arbitration eligible.  That means that their clubs can get major results at an extremely modest cost.

The mere possibility of having a player like this is a general manager's wet dream, particularly in today's new, exceptionally cost-conscious salary market.  Obviously, this has a negative effect on the trade value of the would-be free agent/arbitration eligible player.  Team A, challenging for a pennant, is extremely unlikely to part with a promising AA player for an established big leaguer heading into free agency or arbitration eligibility primarily because of the potential long-term financial implications of doing so.  It's not merely a case of losing a potentially good young player; it's losing a potentially good cheap player.

2) The alternative to trading the would-be free agent is to simply let him play out his option and receive (in the best case scenario) an end-of-first-round draft pick or two as compensation when the player signs elsewhere.  And make no mistake, restricted market or not, a truly valuable player will get offers to play elsewhere.  They may not be of the length or per annum value that we were seeing as recently as a couple of years ago, but there will be offers.  In any event, if you learned nothing from the Amateur Draft History segments posted over the past couple of years, you should now know that the chances of replacing a truly valuable big league player with someone of (ultimately) equal or greater value via a first round draft pick are quite slim.  Even for teams with strong drafting histories (more on this in future Draft History installments), such a move is, decidedly, a sucker's bet.

What's all this got to do with the Orioles?  Plenty.  Of late, the Orioles have done a particularly miserable job of leveraging the value of veteran players to the franchise's benefit.  The fire sale of 2000, now a distant memory, netted the club virtually nothing.  Granted, the team didn't exactly part with sterling material, but they did deal some marketable big league players--a legitimate starting big league catcher, a decent, albeit beleaguered, reliever, a corner outfielder with a reputation (deserved or not) as a gamer, a first baseman with a "clutch bat" reputation, a shortstop to a contending team desperate for a steady glove.  What do the Orioles have to show for that, at this point?  Melvin Mora and (indirectly) AAA Jack Cust, and that's about it.  That ain't much.

Look back to 1998.  The Orioles received nothing but draft picks, ultimately, for the following players from that club who are still playing big league ball:  Rafael Palmeiro, Mike Mussina, Roberto Alomar, Arthur Rhodes.  Those draft picks have, predictably, netted nothing.  Forgive me, but even if they had resulted in something meaningful, a team--particularly one with a notoriously barren farm system like that of the Orioles--simply can't afford to surrender star caliber players like this for draft picks. 

Some have said that the Orioles were put in an untenable position with regard to some of these players--Palmeiro "wanted out, but used the Orioles as leverage."  Mussina "wouldn't waive his no-trade rights."  That kind of thing.  True or not, this is beside the point.  The well-run organization doesn't allow itself to get into positions like this in the first place.  It deals with situations like this before they can deteriorate to such a low ebb.  The well-run club either signs Palmeiro before he enters that free agent season or deals him before that point.  It signs or deals Mussina before he hits the 10-5 status.  But this has not been a well-run organization, by any stretch of the imagination. 

(Occasionally, even well-run clubs goof.  The A's made a big mistake dickering with Jason Giambi until it was too late and they are taking a big, big risk in doing nothing with Miguel Tejada as well.  The Mariners did nothing with Alex Rodriguez (though note that they dealt Randy Johnson--when, admittedly, the bar was a lot lower for such deals than it is now, and Ken Griffey, Jr.).  On the other hand, the A's have been able to develop their own players with great success.  It's arguable that a team with this kind of pipeline can afford to sit on players like this, even if they don't believe that they can be signed.  The Orioles have no such pipeline and no significant history of player development.  If decisions like these are questionable for teams like the A's, they're palpably intolerable for teams like the Orioles.)

The talent level has dropped in the past few seasons, but the Orioles now find themselves, again, in a similar position with, among others, Sidney Ponson.  Ponson's now a month-and-a-half into his final season before free agency.  He doesn't have a contract extension; he wasn't dealt before the season.  And now the Orioles are in another rock-and-a-hard-place situation.  If Ponson continues to pitch effectively, arguably making him worth keeping, his value (he's still only 26) will also go up for potential suitors.  His trade value will be limited, however, for all the reasons outlined above--he's not signed beyond this season; why would anyone give up something of true value for a potential rent-a-player who's never been involved in a pennant race and who's going to be on the market in a few months anyway?--and for a few reasons not mentioned, specific to Ponson (questions about his long-term durability and the nagging question of whether this year's performance is a fluke or a corner turning experience). 

The best guess here is that Ponson will either be traded for yet another bag of magic beans or will play out the season and walk, with the Orioles receiving, in return--surprise, surprise, surprise--a draft pick.

This is exactly the sort of thing that leads to six straight sub-.500 seasons with no end in sight.

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