You will recall from your careful perusal of the final installment of the Stats That Matter Most for 2004 that the Orioles finished sixth in the American League in runs per game this past season.  That's the "forest."  But a look at the "trees," in this instance, is awfully revealing, because it shows where the team's relative offensive strengths and weaknesses lie in comparison with the rest of the league (and the majors).

By means of introduction, the following is reposted from an article I wrote on this same subject at the conclusion of the 2003 season:

In the final analysis, and offense is essentially the sum of its conjoined parts, and a glance at those parts--relative to the rest of Major League Baseball--provides a fairly intuitive recipe for diagnosing the problems and identifying possible solutions.

What follows is a position-by-position breakdown of players (minimum 300 plate appearances) from both leagues sorted by Offensive Winning Percentage.  OWP is a great stat to use when accompanied by a PA minimum because it's park, league and era adjusted and because its definition is so forthcoming.  A .700 OWP means that a team with a full lineup of hypothetical Player Xs would win 70% of its games with an average pitching/defense.  In other words, Player X is a pretty valuable commodity.

The analysis is performed on a position-by-position basis because this all-encompassing measure of offensive production is most robust when a player can be compared with the immediately available alternatives.

(Note:  AL and NL averages at each position are represented by an amalgam of all players who played at that position--not merely those displayed in the table of qualifiers.)

Orioles players are highlighted in orange.  The AL average is shown in red.  The NL average is displayed in green.

CATCHERS

Javy Lopez got the job done, and then some, for the Orioles in 2004.  There was little to choose from between Lopez's rank of fourth and Jason Varitek's #2 slotting.  Perhaps the only disappointment, such as it was, is that Ivan Rodriguez, the player the Orioles didn't choose, finished first.  Still, Lopez was far above the league average in terms of offensive production.  Catcher is a tough spot to draw offense from (witness the two league averages), but the Orioles did very well for themselves at the spot in 2004.  Lopez, a subject of injury concerns, also managed to pile up the second highest number of plate appearances by any major leaguer playing the majority of his games behind the plate.  Only Jason Kendall had more PAs among big league catchers than Javy Lopez in 2004.

FIRST BASEMEN

Rafael Palmeiro (27th of 35 qualifiers) was not an average first baseman in terms of offensive production in 2004, but it's somewhat surprising to see just how close he came to reaching the American League average at the position.  2004 was not a vintage year for AL first basemen.  (Note just how much better National League first baseman fared; the top six players--and seven of the top eight--on this list played in the NL this past season.  The top AL first baseman was Mark Teixeira.)  Palmeiro showed signs of increased performance when he was DHing last year, so in a sense, his production as a first baseman was even worse than what is shown here.  This is one of those "famine" spots, begging for an offensive upgrade, but as of this writing, the Orioles have done nothing to address this need.

SECOND BASEMEN

Second base continues to be a vast wasteland, particularly in the American League where the average level of production scarcely exceeds that of catcher.  Brian Roberts finished 24th out of 34 qualifiers, and was slightly better than the AL average.  Still, it's hard to get excited about anything here.  Only one player on this list who was worse than Roberts qualified for the batting title (Aaron Miles) and he played in the National League.  Only eight American League second basemen qualified for the batting title in 2004, and Roberts finished dead last among them.  Of the qualifiers, Mark Bellhorn was at the top of the heap, with a .577 OWP.  This was not a strong group, and Roberts was the worst of the bunch.  At some point the talent level at this position will improve and if the Orioles are still getting Roberts-like production from their second baseman they're going to have a significant problem.

SHORTSTOP

After years of exceptionally strong performances by a number of players, most if not all of whom will ultimately be elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame, the shortstop position at the major league level is regressing back to its roots as a poor offensive spot.  Alex Rodriguez has been moved to third base and other potent shortstop bats are getting older or have already retired...and they're not being replaced by comparable young talent.  In this climate, Miguel Tejada's value is higher than ever.  In 2004, only a phenomenal season by Carlos Guillen prevented Tejada from finishing first at the position.  Tejada was clearly a huge plus for the Orioles, who haven't had strong offensive performances at shortstop since Cal Ripken's salad days.  Derek Jeter had a putrid first 6-8 weeks of the season and still finished third among all qualifying big league shortstops.  In the National League, where the talent at this position was never as strong to begin with, shortstop has slipped below catcher as the weakest non-pitching position on the diamond.  Securing Tejada, who never misses a game in addition to his consistent production, is looking like a stroke of genius for the Orioles at this point.

THIRD BASEMEN

Third base was a relatively strong position for both leagues in 2004, and Melvin Mora was, easily, the top offensive third baseman in the AL.  He wasn't all that far behind Scott Rolen and Adrian Beltre, who paced the National League.  Mora's transition from passable super sub to legitimate superstar has been nothing short of incredible, and whether it was dumb luck or inspired recognition the Orioles have found themselves another exceptionally strong spot on the field.  The left side of the infield was absolutely stellar for Baltimore in 2004.

LEFT FIELDERS

Larry Bigbie ranked 27th out of 33 qualifying left fielders in 2004, posted an OWP well below the league average and was the best regular the Orioles had in the outfield.  The outfield, as we all know, was a total disaster for the Orioles this past year; it's possible that merely an average overall performance, offensively, from the club's outfield would have produced a .500 or better finish.  Barry Bonds was, of course, on another planet.  It's also interesting to see that Hideki Matsui was essentially as productive as Manny Ramirez.

It doesn't get much worse than this.  Luis Matos was an unmitigated disaster at the plate in 2004, finishing last among AL CF qualifiers.  Only Marlon Byrd, who managed to be slightly less productive somehow, saved Matos from the bottom rung among all qualifying big league center fielders.  Is Matos really this bad?  Probably not...quite.  Still, it's hard to accidentally perform this badly (particularly in light of Matos' overall unimpressive minor league numbers).  Yet, as of this writing, the Orioles have done nothing to replace Matos, unless they plan to retain Jerry Hairston to be the team's starting center fielder.  Despite all the attention surrounding Carlos Beltran this off-season, Jim Edmonds dominated the position in terms of offensive performance.  It's fairly unusual to a see a single team produce three players with super-.700 OWP seasons, but the Cardinals did just that in 2004.

Jay Gibbons, who was supposed to be the starting right fielder all year, was injured a lot and awful when he did play.  Again, it's highly unlikely that he's really this bad (and he was just dreadful in 2004--35th among 36 qualifying right fielders around the majors), but historically he hasn't been significantly more productive than Jerry Hairston was in 2004.  Unfortunately, Hairston himself has never been as productive as he was in 2004 and it's becoming increasingly obvious that he's going to be chronically hurt (he has one big league season with more than 125 appearances).  If Hairston could field like an outfielder (not really a fair expectation since he's spent his entire career in organized baseball in the infield) and could hit like he did in 2004 (his career OWP entering 2004 was .414) and he could stay healthy all year, the Orioles could probably afford to give him a shot as a full-time outfielder (preferably in center), but that's an awfully tall order.  B.J. Surhoff appears to retain some semblance of value as a spare part.  Right field is another position where 2004 production was much higher in the NL than the AL; eight of the top 11 qualifiers at the spot were National Leaguers.

DESIGNATED HITTERS

There are very few qualifiers, so there's not much to say about the DH category.  Suffice to say that it's unlikely that David Newhan will have the opportunity to come to the plate 412 times in 2005 and it's even less likely that he will qualify for the DH board.  It appears likely that Rafael Palmeiro will get the bulk of the ABs at DH next season.

CONCLUSIONS

It doesn't take a genius to see where the strong and weak points for the Orioles are, offensively.  Third base, catcher and shortstop are the team's obvious strengths.  Given how difficult it is to find production at these spots, it would seem that the club would be poised to put together a truly potent offensive unit.  But the Orioles are so weak at some traditionally strong offensive positions--first base, designated hitter, left field, center field and right field--that they all but negate their own disproportionate strengths at traditionally weak offensive positions.  The Orioles arguably can live with Roberts and his middling performance at second, and perhaps they can swallow and live with Bigbie at one of the corners.  Perhaps even Palmeiro at DH will turn out to be a plus.  That leaves two outfield spots and first base desperately in need of some kind of an upgrade.

Time's a-wastin'.

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